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ABSTRACT—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) allows a deponent
thirty days after a deposition in which to make “changes in form or
substance.” Courts are split in their interpretation of just how broad a range
of alterations the Rule envisions and permits. Some take an expansive
reading, presuming that deponents can make whatever changes they see fit,
however radical or contradictory the amendments may seem. Others are
stricter, permitting changes only when a typographical error affected the
form or substance of the transcribed answer. The question of how
permissively to treat a deponent's errata sheet is a vitally important one to
the discovery process, with drastic consequences for individual litigants.
This Comment is the first to comprehensively lay out the case in favor of
strict requirements for deposition changes under Rule 30. It contends that
the history of the Rule, the goals of swift and fair justice, and parallel
developments in the discovery process militate against an expansive reading
of Rule 30(e). Further, it proposes amendments to the Rule’s text that will
cure confusion and etch new procedural parameters to promote fairness in
federal litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
In March of 1992, Linda Carter Greenway testified at a deposition for a
lawsuit she had brought against International Paper Company in the District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana.1 Running over two hundred
pages in length, the transcript of this thorough deposition was sent to Ms.
Greenway for her approval and signature.2 When the court reporter received
back the approved copy, accompanying it was an errata sheet documenting
sixty-four separate places wherein the plaintiff had altered her sworn
testimony.3 These “corrections” turned many of Greenway’s answers on
their heads: locations changed, distances shrank by half, simple “no, sir”
responses became “yes, sir” followed by paragraph-long explanations.4
The reaction from presiding Judge F.A. Little, Jr., was succinct,
forceful, and eminently sensible. “A deposition is not a take home
examination,” he wrote in his opinion, ordering the changes deleted and the
initial deposition treated as definitive—as if the plaintiff had never amended
it and had simply failed to sign it.5
The reasoning of Greenway v. International Paper Co. has proven
influential as federal courts weigh how to handle such profound changes to
deponents’ testimony. The Ninth Circuit, for example, cited Greenway five
1 Greenway v. Int’l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 323 (W.D. La. 1992).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 323–25.
5 Id. at 325.
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years ago, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
striking a plaintiff’s deposition changes.6 But the position that Greenway
staked out remains, in fact, a minority one.
Under the language of Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, deponents are given thirty days after receiving notice that their
deposition testimony is ready in which, “if there are changes in form or
substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the reasons for
making them.”7 This phrase—“changes in form or substance”—has vexed
courts since the Rules were adopted in the late 1930s.8 Some courts take
what I call a “strict approach,” interpreting the phrase narrowly as Judge
Little did in Greenway, while others embrace an expansive, “literal” reading
of Rule 30(e).9 This latter position is usually characterized as the majority
view.10 According to this approach, the phrase “changes in form or
substance” means that deponents can make any changes they wish. Against
the fear that their view gives free license to unscrupulous deponents, courts
adhering to this latter school of thought are often quick to proffer two
countervailing safeguards: that both versions of the deposition remain on
the record11 and that such changes can trigger a reopening of the
deposition.12
Both sides cannot be right. Who has the proper interpretation? And
why should it matter? To tackle the latter question before the former, the
deposition has been called “the essential tool . . . of pre-trial discovery.”13
Whether or not this assessment is true, there can be no dispute that the
deposition functions as one of the vital organs of civil litigation. The rules
that govern depositions have outsized impact on the whole gamut of
litigation—from discovery to summary judgment to trial and beyond.
Hence, the way we permit depositions to be conducted, and thereafter
amended, squarely impacts the administration of justice at every stage. It
also attests to what we truly value as the theoretical underpinnings of the
American discovery process.
Further underscoring the importance of interpreting Rule 30(e) is the
sheer frequency of the situation confronted in Greenway. Too many cases
6 Hambleton Bros. Lumber v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) (1938).
9 Compare Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that the clear language
of Rule 30(e) permits any change that the witness desires), with Summerhouse v. HCA Health Servs. of
Kan., 216 F.R.D. 502, 506–08 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that material changes that controvert original
testimony violate the clear intent of Rule 30(e)).
10 See, e.g., Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 489 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
11 See, e.g., Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 641.
12 See, e.g., Reilly, 230 F.R.D. at 491.
13 E. Stewart Moritz, The Lawyer Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks: Reconsidering the
Contemporaneous Objection Requirement in Depositions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2004)
(emphasis omitted).
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to count, at an increasing rate both at the federal and state level, have forced
courts to consider what changes should be permitted to deposition
transcripts and what changes should be excluded.14
The case law is plentiful on both sides of the divide. But that does not
mean that the arguments in favor of each reading balance each other out.
The truth is that, despite its prevalence and initial appeal, the expansive
reading of Rule 30(e) promotes abuse, does prejudicial harm to litigants,
transgresses the clear limitations of the liberal discovery process, and is at
odds with the transcription-oriented history of the Rule and its predecessor
in equity law.
This Comment is the first to comprehensively lay out the case in favor
of strict requirements for deposition changes under Rule 30 of the Federal
Rules. In it, I contend that the history of the Rule, the goals of swift and fair
justice, and parallel developments in the discovery process militate against
an expansive reading of Rule 30(e). Further, this Comment proposes
amendments to the Rule that would cure it of confusion and etch new
procedural parameters to promote fairness in federal litigation.
The Comment proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II provide necessary
background information: first, sketching the history of depositions in
federal practice and the origins of the Rule itself; second, mapping the
contours of the circuit split and pitting the expansive reading of the Rule
against the different strains of the strict approach that reject it. Part III
unfolds a detailed argument in favor of the strict reading of Rule 30(e),
though not without noting the virtues of the expansive reading. Part IV
provides a solution to the circuit split: permit only changes to correct
transcription errors and amend the Rule to accomplish this aim.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEPOSITION AND RULE 30(E)
A. Depositions
In early federal practice, pleadings largely served the pretrial functions
of providing notice and formulating issues, as well as obtaining and
revealing facts.15 But pleadings proved inadequate for the task, chiefly
because parties engaged in a game of hide-the-ball that resulted in surprise
at the trial stage.16 This was possible because in their first incarnation, prior
14 See, e.g., Steven F. Pflaum & Faustin A. Pipal, Jr., Successful Practice Under the New Illinois
Civil Discovery Rules, CBA REC., Oct. 1995, at 20, 22 (explaining that the Illinois Supreme Court’s
amendment to its equivalent of Rule 30(e) limits deposition changes to correcting transcription errors
and was motivated by increasing abuse of errata sheets); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 207(a) (“[C]orrections
based on errors in reporting or transcription which the deponent desires to make will be entered upon the
deposition . . . .”).
15 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
16 See id. at 501 (explaining that under a deposition-discovery system, civil trials in federal court
“no longer need be carried on in the dark”).
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to the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, depositions did not
function as discovery tools.17 Rather, they were intended to preserve
evidence as an exception to the rule requiring viva voce witness testimony.18
Up until the 1938 adoption of the first version of the Federal Rules, the
Federal Equity Rules governed the American civil system.19 The portion
that initially controlled the deposition process was Equity Rule 67.20
Entitled “Testimony, How Taken,” it was on the books from 1866 until
1911,21 when it was replaced by two new Equity Rules, 50 and 51.22
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) changed
the function of depositions significantly. The drafters of the Rules identified
a discovery-oriented deposition process as the key to eliminating the “trial
by ambush” prevalent in federal courts at the time.23 Looking to
contemporary state deposition rules that allowed for at least some
discovery-related use of the deposition,24 they crafted Federal Rules 26–37
and transformed depositions into “front-line discovery tool[s].”25
This represented a sea change in both the function26 and scope27 of
depositions in pretrial litigation. Through discovery weapons like
depositions and summary judgment, the federal system developed “new
17 Moritz, supra note 13, at 1353.
18 Id. at 1359.
19 See generally Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 649 (1912)
(repealed 1937) (adopting formal rules of equity practice).
20 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxix, lxvii
(1842) (repealed 1937).
21 Id.
22 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 649, 662–63 (1912)
(repealed 1937).
23 See Moritz, supra note 13, at 1367 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26
advisory committee’s note (1938) (declaring that the rule “freely authorizes the taking of depositions”
both for discovery and for obtaining evidence); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery
Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 874‒77 (1933) (laying out the case for discovery through oral 
examination before trial and written by the primary drafter of the original Rules 26–37).
24 See Moritz, supra note 13, at 1366.
25 Id. at 1356.
26 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500‒01 (1947). The Court identified the pretrial 
deposition-discovery mechanism of Rules 26–37 as “one of the most significant innovations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” explaining:
The new rules . . . restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the
deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various instruments
of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow
and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or
information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in
the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.
Id. at 501.
27 See Moritz, supra note 13, at 1369 (noting that the 1938 Rules defined the scope of depositions
expansively, including any nonprivileged but relevant matter).
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devices, with more appropriate penalties to aid in matters of proof.”28 But in
terms of the procedure of the deposition, the changes altered very little. The
drafters instead deliberately maintained the formal and adversarial structure
that depositions assumed under the pre-Rules federal practice.29 The Rules
laid out the features of the deposition that essentially continue today. They
set requirements for the scope30 and use31 of oral depositions, their timing,32
and their recording.33 The Rules retained a trial-style setting in which the
opposing party could question the deponent,34 parties could raise
objections,35 and officers were to preside36 and administer oaths to the
deponents.37
B. Rule 30(e)
Equity Rules 67, 50, and 51 keenly focused on the process of
transcribing the testimony given at deposition.38 But as demonstrated above,
the Equity Rules did anticipate some period of review during which
deponents could express certain concerns about the integrity of the
transcription.
Federal Rule 30(e), adopted in 1938 with advisory committee notes
written the year before, was dedicated to this posttestimonial period. The
Rule’s advisory note made clear that 30(e) “follow[s] the general plan of
[former] Equity Rule 51” and indicates that Rule 30(e) had roots in Equity
Rule 50 as well.39 The note added that Rule 30(e) “permit[s] the deponent to
require the officer to make changes in the deposition if the deponent is not
satisfied with it.”40 The Rule itself states: “Any changes in form or
substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the
deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the
witness for making them.”41
28 Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase—Underlying
Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977
(1937) (emphasis omitted).
29 Moritz, supra note 13, at 1373 (“[T]he conduct of the deposition itself looked very much the
same under the new Rules as it did in the years immediately preceding.”).
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938).
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d) (1938).
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 30(a) (1938).
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938).
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938).
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e) (1938).
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a) (1938).
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938).
38 See infra notes 152‒164 and accompanying text. 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) & (e) advisory committee’s note (1938) (second alteration in original).
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) & (e) advisory committee’s note (1938).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) (1938).
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The essence of Rule 30(e)’s text, devoted to errata alterations, has
changed only cosmetically since 1938, with the exception of some technical
requirements. In 1993, a provision was added to require a signature only
when a deponent requested to review the transcript.42 The 1993 amendment
also instituted a thirty-day window in which deponents could submit their
changes and reasons for making them.43 The accompanying advisory note
explained that the committee added this window “to reduce problems
sometimes encountered when depositions are taken stenographically.”44
The phrase “form or substance” persisted in the versions of Rule 30(e)
that followed the 1938 original, down to the present day.45 The Rule does
not, nor has it ever, defined the terms “form” and “substance.”46 The current
language of the Rule, as it relates to deposition changes, is as follows:
On request by the deponent or a party before the deposition is completed,
the deponent must be allowed 30 days after being notified by the officer that
the transcript or recording is available in which: (A) to review the transcript or
recording; and (B) if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a
statement listing the changes and the reasons for making them.47
II. ANATOMY OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT
In the first few years after Rule 30(e)’s adoption, cases involving
disputes over transcription changes appear to have risen rarely—perhaps
because the rules surrounding the newfound purposes of depositions had
been changed so recently that it took time for deponents and lawyers to
work up the temerity and creativity to circumvent them. The first opinion
on record to address the question was De Seversky v. Republic Aviation
Corp., a 1941 case.48 There, a deposition unfolded under what the court
labeled “unusual” circumstances, continuing gradually, “from time to time,”
over the course of several months.49 Afterwards, the deponent plaintiff
amended his transcript under Rule 30(e) to contradict previous answers and
the opposing party moved for an order requiring him to appear before the
examining officer.50 The motion aimed to force the deponent to face new
questions and explain under oath the reasons for his changes.51
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) & advisory committee’s note (1993).
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) & advisory committee’s note (1993).
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) & advisory committee’s note (1993).
45 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e).
46 See infra notes 165–170 and accompanying text (providing working definitions through examples
of what would reasonably fall into each category).
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1).
48 2 F.R.D. 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (“I have not been presented with, nor have I found, any
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The unusual factual circumstances of De Seversky help crystallize the
issue. The court suggested that it might be “not unreasonable,” in the setting
of such a protracted deposition, that a deponent might need to correct
certain answers.52 It follows that only in such odd circumstances could
nontranscriptive changes possibly be permissible in order to maintain the
integrity and coherence of sporadic testimony. Moreover, the court crucially
noted that “[a] witness . . . should not be able to destroy the usefulness of an
examination by the means employed here.”53
By the next decade, however, a few cases surfaced that reached the
opposite conclusion and paved the way for an expansive approach to
allowing changes in depositions. One such case was Colin v. Thompson, in
which the district court cited De Seversky, yet held that under Rule 30(e) a
deponent has the right to make changes, with or without good reason.54
The dissonance that these early cases document carries into the present
day and sets the scene for the discord we find in the case law on Rule 30(e).
The divergent conclusions illustrate the competing considerations at work
in the case law split: the desire to receive testimony within the liberal
discovery process confronts the danger that a deponent may well undermine
the deposition’s integrity and thereby prejudice the opposing party. This
Comment proceeds now to explore the manners in which the authority split
manifests these competing ideas.
A. The Expansive Reading
The essence of the expansive reading of Rule 30(e) is that the phrase
“changes in form or substance” corresponds to a wide berth for deponents.
Its most well-known articulation is from the case of Lugtig v. Thomas,
decided in 1981.55 In Lugtig, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois contended that “[t]he language of the Rule places no
limitations on the type of changes that may be made by a witness before
signing his deposition” to make it final.56 Nor, continued the court, does the
language require a judge to examine “the sufficiency, reasonableness, or
legitimacy of the reasons for the changes.”57
52 Id.
53 Id. at 115.
54 16 F.R.D. 194, 195 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
55 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981). It is worth noting that both Lugtig and Greenway, which is cited
with similar frequency in favor of the strict reading, are district court opinions. The Supreme Court has
not taken a position on the issue. The first circuit court opinion on point did not appear until 1997. See
Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1997). By that time, both Lugtig and
Greenway had taken hold as the most referenced articulations of their respective positions. See, e.g.,
Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 487, 89 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (identifying Greenway as “[t]he case
cited most frequently” in favor of a narrow reading, and Lugtig as the “principal case” that stands for the
broad reading of Rule 30(e)).
56 89 F.R.D. at 641.
57 Id.
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While the Lugtig approach is often labeled the majority approach,58 it is
in fact the minority among circuit courts. The Second Circuit adopted
Lugtig’s reasoning in Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc.,59 and remains the
only court of appeals to do so.60 Together, the two cases stand for the
proposition that an expansive reading of Rule 30(e) can minimize
unfairness by preserving the original answers on the record for
impeachment purposes.61 Lugtig also identifies a second safeguard against
unfairness: the reopening of the deposition for further questioning once a
deponent has made changes of a sufficient “number and type.”62
B. Stricter Readings: A Range of Interpretations
Courts that adopt a stricter reading are united in their contention that
the expansive reading is overbroad and prone to promote questionable
tactics.63 These courts “focus on the strategic interest of taking a deposition;
namely to capture and preserve testimony in an adversarial manner” that
parties can reasonably rely on to make their case.64 These courts therefore
hold on to an implied notion that deposition testimony should be regarded
as akin to trial testimony, and thus not open to changes in accord with
whatever caprice or ulterior motive a deponent harbors during the errata
period.65 Although these opinions espouse a strict reading of the Rule, the
extent to which they constrict changes varies.
1. Strictest of All: Greenway.—The strictest of the strict approaches
remains the most cited articulation, and comes from the Western District of
Louisiana’s opinion in Greenway v. International Paper Co.66 In Greenway,
the court listed a series of the plaintiff’s deposition answers, counterpoised
with her contradictory errata changes.67 The opinion then struck the changes
and staked its central claim:
58 See, e.g., Reilly, 230 F.R.D. at 489 (“The broad view espoused by the Lugtig court has been
characterized as the traditional or majority view.”).
59 See 112 F.3d at 103.
60 Appellate courts that have adopted some version of the strict approach include the Third,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See discussion infra Part II.B.2‒II.B.3. 
61 Podell, 112 F.3d at 103; Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 641.
62 Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 642 (concluding that the plaintiff’s changes in fact did necessitate reopening
the examination).
63 See, e.g., Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000) (commenting
that reading the Rule broadly provides a “questionable basis for altering a deposition”).
64 See Christopher Macchiaroli & Danielle Tarin, Rewriting the Record: A Federal Court Split on
the Scope of Permissible Changes to a Deposition Transcript, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
65 See, e.g., A. Darby Dickerson, Deposition Dilemmas: Vexatious Scheduling and Errata Sheets,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 57 (1998).
66 144 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. La. 1992).
67 Id. at 323–25.
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The purpose of Rule 30(e) is obvious. Should the reporter make a
substantive error, i.e., he reported “yes” but I said “no,” or a formal error, i.e.,
he reported the name to be “Lawrence Smith” but the proper name is
“Laurence Smith,” then corrections by the deponent would be in order. The
Rule cannot be interpreted to allow one to alter what was said under oath. If
that were the case, one could merely answer the questions with no thought at
all then return home and plan artful responses.68
The Greenway approach, then, limits permissible changes to ones that
are transcriptive in nature in order to cure clerical errors that prevented the
testimony from being fully and accurately reported. This, Greenway
contends, captures the purpose of Rule 30(e).69 The deficiency that
Greenway diagnoses in the expansive approach is clear: the risk of bad faith
dealings once deponents are away from the scrutiny that accompanies their
live testimony and the oath that precedes it.70 To counter this potential for
bad faith and to avoid turning the deposition into what the court memorably
called a “take home examination,” the court held that postdeposition
changes must be limited to errors of transcription.71
2. No New Factual Issues: The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits.—Greenway has been cited frequently but has not always
been followed to its full extent. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, for example,
have adopted a version of the strict approach that is more forgiving and
centers on the danger that fundamental errata changes can pose to pending
or potential summary judgment dispositions.72
The Tenth Circuit adopted its approach first, through dicta at the very
end of an opinion called Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club.73 Citing
Greenway’s admonition against take-home examinations, the court
expressed its distress with defendant’s “reliance upon errata from
deposition testimony where that errata strayed substantively from the
original testimony.”74 Two years later, the court entered its opinion in Burns
v. Board of County Commissioners, a case that, like Garcia, related to a
summary judgment appeal.75 There, the court equated a deponent’s material
changes with the content of a sham affidavit, which is disregarded “when it




72 In passing language, the Sixth Circuit has indicated some sympathy for a similar approach, but
has not subsequently clarified or revisited the issue. See Trout v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., 339 F.
App’x 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting an Ohio district court case, Tuttle v. Tyco Elecs. Installation
Servs., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-581, 2008 WL 343178, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2008), that reproduces
Greenway’s “take-home examination” language).
73 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002).
74 Id.
75 330 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2003).
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‘constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue’” to defeat summary
judgment.76 The court saw no reason to treat Rule 30(e) corrections any
differently and held that the deponent’s changes did not pass muster under
the circuit’s sham affidavit analysis.77
Two years after Burns, the Ninth Circuit followed with the case of
Hambleton Bros. Lumber v. Balkin Enterprises, Inc.78 The court held that
“Rule 30(e) is to be used for corrective, and not contradictory, changes.”79
Additionally, using the sham affidavit parallel, the court held that while
Rule 30(e) permits corrections “in form or substance,” it does not permit
“changes offered solely to create a material factual dispute in a tactical
attempt to evade an unfavorable summary judgment.”80
The rule in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits thus invalidates deposition
changes in a smaller set of circumstances than Greenway’s rule does.
Rather than disallowing all nonclerical amendments, courts in these circuits
strike deposition answers that aim to create new facts (or contradict facts
from the earlier testimony) in order to sidestep a Rule 56 summary
judgment motion. Changes that are corrective or that merely clarify may be
permitted.81
3. No Contradictions: Thorn and the Seventh Circuit.—The Seventh
Circuit moved a step further away from Greenway, but remains squarely in
the strict camp. The controlling case is Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace
Corp., in which then-Chief Judge Richard Posner wrote the majority
opinion in 2000.82 Thorn focuses on the sham affidavit context too,
prohibiting any substantive change under Rule 30(e) “which actually
contradicts the transcript . . . unless it can plausibly be represented as the
correction of an error in transcription.”83 Unlike Hambleton Bros. and
Burns, Thorn does not extend this prohibition to instances where deponents
attempt to use new information to create factual disputes—something Judge
Posner chalked up to questionable strategy but read the Rule to permit.84
Specifically, the court allowed a deponent in an age discrimination case to
change his testimony from “what he said to what he meant.”85 This involved
striking his assertion that his company carried out layoffs based on “long-
term potential” of workers and replacing it with the assertion that layoffs
76 Id. at 1282 (quoting Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986)).
77 Id.
78 397 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
79 Id. at 1226.
80 Id. at 1225 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. at 1225–26.
82 207 F.3d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 2000).
83 Id. at 389.
84 See id.
85 Id.
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were based on long-term potential of the product lines with which they
worked.86
4. A “More Flexible Approach”: Clark Building Systems and the
Third Circuit.—The most recent addition to the growing number
of circuits that reject an expansive approach to Rule 30(e) is the Third
Circuit. In EBC, Inc. v. Clark Building Systems, Inc., the court addressed
the Rule in a summary judgment context.87 The court asserted that the
expansive reading’s safeguards “may often prove to be insufficient
remedies.”88 As in the previously mentioned cases, the court applied its
sham affidavit analysis.89 But because the circuit’s sham affidavit approach
differs from that of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, its analysis
produced a different standard. The Third Circuit uses a “more flexible
approach” to the sham affidavit doctrine,90 under which each case is
considered according to its fact-specific circumstances.91 Thus, depending
upon the situation, a court may refuse to consider materially contradictory
changes or may admit them at its discretion.92
III. CHOOSING SIDES: WHY DEPOSITIONS SHOULD BE STRICTLY POLICED
Having sketched the developmental contours of both the Rule itself
and the conflicted body of case law that it has occasioned, this Comment
turns now to an argument in favor of policing the deposition process more
strictly than an expansive reading supports. It starts by laying out the most
persuasive aspects of the expansive approach. Then, it identifies the points
where the approach begins to falter. The bulk of this Part then develops the
reasons why the strict reading is the proper interpretation of Rule 30(e).
A. Giving the Expansive Reading Its Due
It is important to begin by recognizing the charms of the expansive
reading. The interpretation has its learned defenders, and this is because it
has its logical appeals. The plain language of Rule 30(e), the notion of a
liberal discovery process, and the availability of other legal safeguards all
lend strength to the expansive reading. None of them, however, are enough
in the end to save it.
1. The Appeal of “Plain Language.”—The words of Rule 30(e) are
plain, and these plain words refer to changes in form or in substance.
86 Id.
87 618 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2010).
88 Id. at 268.
89 See id. at 268‒69. 
90 Id. at 269 (quoting Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 2007))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
91 Id. at 270.
92 See id. at 267‒70 (including a list of factors considered under the circuit’s flexible approach). 
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Additionally, the Rule instructs court officers to attach “any changes the
deponent makes” to the certificate that they append to the deposition
transcript when it is ready for filing.93
Any well-reasoned position in favor of strict deposition rules must
grapple with the presence of these words, as well as the absence of any
obvious qualifiers that would explicitly limit their scope.94 The Rule’s
references to both form and substance are not recent additions. Indeed, their
inclusion predates the Rule’s most recent substantive amendment in 1993;
the phrasing, prior to that year’s changes, was “[a]ny changes in form or
substance which the witness desires to make.”95 Reading this language, it is
not entirely shocking that a court might reason, as the Southern District of
Ohio once did, that “under the Rule, changed deposition answers of any sort
are permissible, even those which are contradictory or unconvincing, as
long as the procedural requirements set forth in the Rule are also
followed.”96
2. The Breadth of the Liberal Discovery Process.—Adding to the
allure of the expansive interpretation is the oft-repeated maxim that the
discovery process in the federal district courts is a liberal one. The Federal
Rules bestow upon depositions the role of primary discovery tool.97 And
“the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment.”98 The changes that the movement towards deposition-discovery
rules wrought were decidedly positive; they nudged trials away from their
tendency to devolve into a surprise-ridden game of blind man’s bluff and in
the direction of a fair contest.99 Any move that pushes back against this
momentum threatens to carry an air of unwelcome retrogression.
3. The Appeal of “Safeguards.”—Finally, the expansive approach
draws some additional persuasive force from the two major safeguards put
forth by its defenders: (a) a possible reopening of the deposition, and (b) the
near certainty that both versions of the deposition will be maintained in the
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(2).
94 See, e.g., Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (concluding that the broad
reading of Rule 30(e) is “consistent with the plain language of the Rule which expressly contemplates
‘changes in form or substance,’” and eschewing a stricter reading); Kirin K. Gill, Comment, Depose and
Expose: The Scope of Authorized Deposition Changes Under Rule 30(e), 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357,
373‒76 (2007) (invoking the canons of plain meaning and noscitur a sociis to argue for a “broad”
construction of permissible changes in light of the use of the words “form,” “substance,” and “any”).
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) (1970).
96 United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng’g, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 565, 566–67 (S.D. Ohio 1993)
(reproducing the 1993 language and emphasizing the word “any” in justifying its expansive reading of
the Rule).
97 See discussion supra Part I.
98 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
99 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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record.100 At the very least, the existence of these checks serve as warning to
deponents that, in a jurisdiction that reads Rule 30(e) as fairly open, they do
not make their substantive changes in a vacuum or without any
consequence whatsoever.
The first safeguard aims to ensure that in making large-scale changes,
the deponent—or the deponent’s attorney if counsel goads the deponent to
make the changes—may trigger a renewed round of deposition testimony.101
The prospect of this mechanism might cause deponents to think twice
before changing denials to affirmatives or vice versa. And if triggered, the
reopening may visit some justified punishment upon a deponent’s case. A
second deposition may puncture a hole in the deponent’s credibility by
giving an attorney the chance to ask follow-up questions.102 Further, a
second deposition can also punish deponents’ pocketbooks by forcing them
to pay for the opposing party’s expenses (in addition to their own) in taking
the second deposition.103
The second safeguard aims to ensure that, even where courts are
reluctant to reopen a deposition, either because, under the expansive
approach, they believe in letting all changes stand, or because they do not
find an errata sheet in a particular instance to sufficiently contradict prior
answers, they may still keep both versions of the deposition—old and
amended—on the factual record.104 This raises a tactical specter that might
frighten a deponent who is otherwise tempted to make wholesale changes.
After all, it is poor trial strategy in most instances to provide inconsistent
answers.105 The existence and extent of the discrepancies “are treated as
100 See, e.g., Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (expressing confidence in
the expansive reading, contending that “[w]hile the Court wholly agrees that a deposition should not be
a ‘take home examination,’ [this] approach allows for legitimate corrective changes while implementing
adequate safeguards to prevent abuse” (citation omitted)). It is worth noting that the safeguards are
meant to protect parties against any such bad faith changes, even when the deponent in such
circumstances is not himself the party opponent.
101 See, e.g., Foutz v. Town of Vinton, 211 F.R.D. 293, 295 (W.D. Va. 2002) (holding that because
plaintiff’s proposed changes were “so substantive,” the deposition would be reopened to give defendants
the chance to question plaintiff on the basis of his contradictions).
102 See Reilly, 230 F.R.D. at 491 (“Defendants may inquire about the reasons for the changes and
the source of the changes, such as whether they came from Plaintiff himself or his counsel. In addition,
Defendants may also ask follow-up questions to the changed responses.” (citation omitted)).
103 See, e.g., Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 642 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“Since it is defendant’s actions
which necessitate reopening the examination of defendant, the costs and attorneys fees connected with
the continued deposition will be borne by defendant.”).
104 See Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the
district court was right to make deponent’s changed answers simply a part of the record along with
original answers, rather than allowing him to replace the original answers).
105 See Dickerson, supra note 65, at 59–60. Dickerson suggests that the language of Rule 30(e), as
written, most logically endorses an approach that permits the court to accept changes, but also permits
“opposing counsel, at her choosing, to introduce both versions to the jury.” Id. at 60.
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subjects for impeachment that may affect the witness’s credibility,”106 even
without a second round of depositions.
B. Stretching and Tension
Despite the pull of the expansive interpretation of Rule 30(e), and
despite the prevalence of this interpretation among district courts, it is fair
to take note of the curious ways in which courts that adopt it find
themselves stretching to justify their decisions. By cataloguing some of
these stretching exercises, one begins to face some very substantive and not
yet fully unpacked reasons why the expansive reading falls short.
First, while courts that rely upon the expansive approach are quick to
echo the forceful pronouncement of Lugtig that “[t]he language of the Rule
places no limitations on the type of changes that may be made” and requires
no examination of the “sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the
reasons for the changes,”107 the case law raises questions about how much
of this is lip service and how much is true conviction. Closer inspection
shows that these same courts are often quick to toss those changes on the
grounds of other technicalities elsewhere in the Rule.108 In addition to its
provisions regarding the manner of permissible changes, Rule 30(e) lays out
other, far less hotly contended, procedural instructions. Several of these
instructions have been used to avoid taking sides on the errata question109 or
to effectively thwart the admission of amended deposition answers in
opinions that otherwise profess to subscribe to the expansive approach.
These procedures include: failing to request review of the deposition before
106 Holden v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. H-06-3958, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94470, at *7 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 27, 2007).
107 Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 641. A quick Shepardizing expedition of this case on November 22, 2010,
yielded at least fourteen federal opinions issued since 1999 that quote its holding favorably—even
though Judge Posner rendered it bad law within its own circuit over a decade ago in Thorn v. Sundstrand
Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000).
108 Dickerson, supra note 65, at 55 n.270. (“A close reading of many ‘errata sheet’ cases suggests
that when courts who embrace [the expansive] reading of Rule 30(e) are upset with the type [and] extent
of changes . . . they strike the offending changes based on the deponent’s failure to comply with some
technical aspect of Rule 30(e).”); see also Ilya A. Lipin, Litigation Tactics Addressing Changes to
Deposition Testimony Through Rule 30(e) Errata Sheet Corrections, 63 ARK. L. REV. 741, 748–49
(2010) (encouraging practitioners to “attempt to preclude errata-sheet changes based on procedural
grounds” in light of the expansive approach’s prevalence).
109 See, e.g., Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 232 F.R.D. 491, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“Although
courts are split over whether to allow substantive changes to a deposition, there is no debate that the
procedural requirements of Rule 30(e) must be adhered to.”). In Agrizap, a breach of contract case
decided before the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and appealed to the Third
Circuit, the witness changed his deposition responses from “I think we were offering them for sale” to “I
don’t think we were offering them for sale” and from “Yeah” to “No.” Id. at 492 (emphases omitted).
The court suppressed the changes not on the grounds that they amounted to arrant contradictions of
previous testimony that cut to the heart of the complaint, but rather on the technical grounds that more
than thirty days had passed and the deponent had not requested to review the transcript. Id. at 493.
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amending it,110 failing to meet the thirty-day time requirement for
changes,111 failing to list the reasons for any change,112 and failing to submit
the changes to the court reporter.113 Courts sometimes make far more
rigorous demands on deponents to show compliance with these technical
measures than to show proper cause for the changes they attempt to make
on the errata sheet.114 This method seems little more than an effort to
accomplish by technicality what judges, squeamish to defy majority
thinking in their jurisdiction, cannot bring themselves to do directly:
disqualify spurious deposition alterations.115
Second, the very invocation of the expansive approach’s safeguards—
reopening depositions and maintaining original answers on the record—
amounts to a kind of judicial stretching. It requires little more than a quick
glance at the wording of Rule 30(e) to observe that the Rule mentions
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1); see also Agrizap, 232 F.R.D. at 493 (holding, before the Third Circuit
adopted a version of the strict approach, that a deponent who reversed substantive deposition answers
was barred from changing the transcript for failure to request review).
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1); see also Porter v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., No. 01-2970-
MaV, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14089, at *8–10 (W.D. Tenn. July 28, 2003) (holding that Rule 30(e) is not
necessarily “limited only to corrections of errors made in transcribing,” but striking the substantively
altered errata sheet of an expert witness in full because of failure to comply with the time requirement);
Davidson Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)
(excluding an errata sheet signed over sixty days after original transcript became available); Pepper’s
Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 85-0571-CIV-SPELLMAN, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21564, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 1991) (commenting that the Rule 30(e) time constraint ensures
that deponents correct testimony while it is still fresh in their minds).
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1)(B); see also Holland v. Cedar Creek Mining, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 651, 653
(S.D. W. Va. 2001) (finding that courts usually “permit any changes,” but granting motion to exclude
changes because deponent failed to provide reasons for them (quoting Hlinko v. Virgin Atlantic
Airways, No. 96Civ.2873(KMW)(THK), 1997 WL 68563, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1997) (internal
quotation mark omitted)); Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 803–04 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(striking changes for lack of explanation before the Seventh Circuit adopted its version of the strict
reading in 2000 in Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000)).
113 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1)‒(2); see also Reed v. Hernandez, 114 F. App’x 609, 611 (5th Cir.
2004) (upholding the district court’s ruling to exclude an improperly filed errata sheet where deponent
never submitted the changes to the court reporter, and thus electing not to reach the district court’s
second reason for exclusion: improper substantive changes).
114 See, e.g., Holland, 198 F.R.D. at 653 (“This court, like most courts, will insist on strict
adherence to the technical requirements of Rule 30(e).”).
115 Ironically, the history of the Federal Rules suggests that failure to comply with the technical
requirements for depositions was to be considered at worst a venial sin. A 1936 provision in the
Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft to what is now Rule 32 cautioned that “[n]one of the foregoing
errors or irregularities, even when not waived, nor any others, shall preclude or restrict the use of the
deposition.” PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 67 (1936). The provision
lists one telling exception, however: “except in so far as the court shall find that they substantially
destroy its value as evidence or render its use unfair or prejudicial.” Id. (emphasis added). This sounds
exactly how one might explain the dangers that the strict reading of Rule 30(e) seeks to combat.
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neither of these restraints.116 Neither Rule 30(e) nor any other rule alludes to
deposition safeguards.117 It is hard to square this fact with the textual fidelity
that advocates of the expansive approach claim for themselves. And
although judges are known to devise their own solutions to the problems
that rules name, those solutions should rest on some clear connection to the
language and underlying purpose of the rules themselves—particularly
when judges so forcefully invoke textualism to justify their decisions. The
expansive reading’s twin safeguards do not appear in, nor do they implicitly
flow from, the text of Rule 30(e). The Rule says what it says, or it does not.
The stretches in logic undertaken in these “majority approach” cases
and the cases’ selective emphasis on textualism are two flaws that hint at
the superiority of the strict reading. But they are far from alone in leading
us away from the expansive reading. This Comment now turns to
examining more thoroughly why the strict approach most successfully deals
with the range of changes that deponents attempt to make under Rule 30(e).
C. Why the Strict Approach Works Best
The simplest and most direct diagnosis of the expansive reading of
Rule 30(e) is that it falls short. Acolytes of this reading dangle safeguards in
front of parties affected by an opponent’s cavalier deposition changes, but
these safeguards amount to an ounce of comfort against a pound of
potential trouble. The lack of oversight, restriction, or emphasis on the
contemporaneousness of making changes in the deposition-taking process
turn the deposition into a different, less reliable, and less unique discovery
tool. Moreover, the “plain language” of the Rule vindicates the expansive
reading only when the language is read in an ahistorical, context-free
vacuum. Finally, the liberal discovery process of the American federal court
system only supports the expansive reading when liberality is construed to
preclude any well-defined, outer common-sense boundaries.
1. “Safeguards”: Reliability, Deterrence and the Interrogatory
Parallel.—When a deponent submits a substantially altered errata
sheet, courts adopting the expansive approach almost invariably try to
reassure the uneasy party on the opposite side of the lawsuit. These
reassurances most frequently take the shape of a recitation of the safeguards
the court will put in place to protect the opponent from prejudice: keeping
both deposition versions on the record and reopening the deposition.118 The
116 Taking this a step further, a few courts subscribing to the expansive reading of Rule 30(e) have
undertaken an additional layer of extratextual thinking: determining whether opposing counsel has the
right to attend the deposition modifications if a second round of questioning is triggered. See, e.g.,
Perkasie Indus., Corp. v. Advance Transformer, Inc., No. 90-7359, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431, at *10
(E.D. Pa. June 11, 1992) (concluding that opposing counsel does have that right).
117 See Dickerson, supra note 65, at 64 (observing that there are no built-in deterrents in Rule 30(e),
only court-developed methods that may, or may not, always be followed).
118 See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (discussing safeguards).
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archetypal version of this judicial guarantee—and still probably the most
fervent—comes from the Lugtig case. “The original answer to the
deposition,” Judge Will explained in his memorandum opinion, “will
remain part of the record and can be read at the trial.”119 Quoting from
Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure, the judge continued, “the
cross-examiner and the jury are likely to be keenly interested in the reasons
[the deponent] changed his testimony.”120
But strategic deterrents succeed only if a court is willing to take
seriously the shifts in answers that are supposed to trigger them. This is no
sure thing. Explaining that courts can reopen depositions where changes
have rendered them “incomplete or useless,”121 for example, requires
something of a leap of faith that judges who see no requirement in the Rule
to “examine the sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reasons for
the changes”122 will nonetheless make the determination required to find
that the “number and type of changes” justify the reopening of the
deposition.123
When read expansively, Rule 30(e) gives deponents over four weeks to
alter their answers in any manner they wish before sending them back to the
court and opposing counsel. For this reason, the Greenway v. International
Paper Co. opinion drew a parallel between such “corrected” depositions
and written interrogatories, contending that the two should be more distinct
than such an approach encourages.124 As other courts have adopted
Greenway’s approach—or some variation thereof—they have echoed this
analysis.125 The comparison is appropriate, and the observation that the two
should not blur together so easily seems intuitive enough. In the federal
system, depositions are governed by Rules 27 to 32,126 where they are
explicitly mentioned in the heading of each rule except Rule 29, making
clear that this is their subject. Interrogatories are separately covered in Rule
119 Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
120 Id. at 642.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 641.
123 See id. at 642. A particularly eye-opening example of such misplaced faith is the case of Allen &
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the very case to which Lugtig cites
for its proposition that “the language of the Rule places no limitations on the types of changes that may
be made by a witness before signing his deposition.” Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 641. In Allen, even in the face
of 377 changes to the witness’ deposition, the court found that the changes did not so directly contradict
testimony on vital points to necessitate reopening the deposition. Allen, 49 F.R.D. at 341.
124 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992) (“If that were the case, one could merely answer the
questions with no thought at all then return home and plan artful responses. Depositions differ from
interrogatories in that regard.”).
125 See, e.g., Burns v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 330 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting this
section of Greenway in a decision that adopted a strict reading of Rule 30(e)); Garcia v. Pueblo Country
Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting same).
126 See FED. R. CIV. P. 27–32.
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33, a Rule from which the word “deposition” is tellingly absent.127 Though
it is true that a submitted interrogatory under Rule 33 carries no
requirement to provide reasons for answers,128 as a Rule 30(e) errata sheet
does, the borders between these two distinct forms begin to collapse as
more freedom is allowed during the “correction” phase of a deposition. This
is because what fundamentally makes the deposition different from, and
more reliable than, the interrogatory is not the compulsory force of some
vaguely defined requirement to explain errata changes,129 but rather the
contemporaneous nature of the deposition-taking process itself. Requiring
some degree of instantaneousness between the question and the answer
gives the responding party less time to reconsider and then contrive a less
true but more favorable answer.130 The higher degree of reliability offered—
at least theoretically—by the deposition collapses as courts abdicate their
responsibility to police the correction process under Rule 30(e).
2. “Safeguards”: Sham Affidavits and Summary Judgment.—While
the interrogatory parallel is instructive, the better analogy for questionable
errata sheet conduct is to the common law doctrine of the sham affidavit.
This is precisely because of the way both can impact the success of a
summary judgment motion under Rule 56, which both practices seem
improperly directed toward sidestepping. The expansive approach’s
safeguards are small consolation to parties for whom summary judgment is
denied or delayed as a result of an opponent’s efforts to refashion his sworn
deposition testimony.131 Naturally, strategic deterrents succeed only if a
127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
129 But see Gill, supra note 94, at 377–78 (arguing that this particular difference is what separates
an interrogatory on the one hand and a deposition amended under a liberally construed Rule 30(e) on the
other).
130 This thinking is an important underpinning of the hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See Macchiaroli & Tarin, supra note 64, at 11; see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL: STUDENT EDITION § 16.02[1] (8th ed. 2007) (explaining
the reasoning behind Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1)’s hearsay exception for a present sense
impression is that the spontaneous nature of the statement, following shortly after an event or condition,
gives the declarant “little or no opportunity to fabricate”). This is not to say that the setting of a
deposition is in any way precisely like the setting of a present-sense-impression situation—deponents
obviously are removed from the events giving rise to the suit, and likely consult with counsel in some
detail before answering questions. But the underlying logic is similar in at least one important respect:
deponents, at the time of deposition, must give answers contemporaneously, without input from their
counsel; for that reason, the answers given at the time of the deposition generally merit a higher degree
of trustworthiness than the revisions to those answers, submitted after a thirty-day window in which to
consult with counsel about the answers’ contents.
131 See EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopting a version of
the strict approach that allows a district court to refuse to consider changes to a deposition when
deciding a motion for summary judgment). In rejecting the expansive interpretation of Rule 30(e), the
court reasoned:
[R]equiring trial judges in all cases to permit contradictory alterations could risk the defeat of
summary judgment in a large swath of cases for which a Rule 56 disposition otherwise would be
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deponent (and her counsel) believes that the potential risks of ignoring the
deterrent outweigh the benefits.132 Outright prohibitions are therefore more
effective. In the cases of deponents who know their suits will otherwise be
doomed at the summary judgment stage, the possible benefit of ignoring the
deterrent is obvious: simple survival.
At a time when less than 2% of federal cases end in trial,133 depositions
have become “almost exclusively a discovery tool.”134 Summary judgment
looms large in the landscape that inevitably results from this picture.135
Attorneys, aware of the likely disposition of their cases at the pretrial stage,
often view the taking of depositions as an opportunity to collect
“straightforward admissions that can later form the basis of a motion for
summary judgment.”136 Deponents can frustrate opposing counsel’s effort
when they alter their answers—either inoculating them against any harmful
effect by erasing admissions or fortifying them with new content so as to
give the appearance of novel factual issues.137 The less strictly that Rule
30(e) is interpreted, the more leeway a deponent has to do just that.
Of course, errata sheets are not the only device by which a party can
accomplish such questionable ends. Courts and legal scholars have been
grappling for decades with similar problems in the context of
postdeposition, or “sham,” affidavits.138 Because courts in a summary
judgment context must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant,139 the nonmoving party can thwart the movant’s case by
appropriate. Preservation of the original testimony for impeachment at trial serves as cold comfort
to the party that should have prevailed at summary judgment.
Id.
132 Dickerson, supra note 65, at 64.
133 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 459, 461 (2004). For a more recent update on this statistic,
see Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, “A Grin Without a Cat”: Civil Trials in Federal Courts (May 1,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/Duke%20Materials/Library/Marc%20Galanter%20and%20Angela%20Frozena,%20A%20Grin%20Wit
hout%20a%20Cat.pdf.
134 Moritz, supra note 13, at 1356.
135 See Macchiaroli & Tarin, supra note 64, at 2.
136 Id.
137 See id. In just one instance of this phenomenon, Hambleton Bros., the court recounted twenty-
seven portions of the plaintiff’s deposition that he “clearly altered to allege facts sufficient . . . where
none before existed.” 397 F.3d 1217, 1225 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). The deponent originally asserted, for
example, that he did not know what the defendant had said to deceive him; he then changed this answer
to reference, for the first time, a conversation in 1996 or 1997 in which defendant directly deceived him.
Id.
138 See generally Michael D. Moberly, Applying the Sham Affidavit Doctrine in Arizona, 38 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 995, 998‒99 (2006) (discussing the use of the sham affidavit doctrine to preserve the integrity of
the summary judgment process in Arizona and noting the doctrine’s acceptance in most state and federal
courts).
139 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Burns v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 330 F.3d 1275, 1280–81 (10th
Cir. 2003).
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introducing an affidavit contradicting earlier deposition testimony.140 Courts
developed the sham affidavit doctrine to constrain the practice.141 Under the
doctrine, a court can protect the integrity of the summary judgment process
by disregarding a sham affidavit that is inconsistent with the affiant’s earlier
deposition testimony.142 From its origins in a 1969 Second Circuit
decision,143 the doctrine has spread and developed to the point where the
majority of federal and state courts recognize it as a means of policing the
discovery process and weeding out improper efforts to create factual issues
before summary judgment disposition.144
For the past decade, federal courts have noted the parallels between
sham affidavits and errata sheet corrections.145 They have done so with good
reason. To fail to treat errata sheet corrections the same way as sham
affidavits threatens to give so much latitude to deponents that it would
effectively threaten to render Rule 56 procedures a nullity.146 Summary
judgment would hardly, if ever, be granted if Rule 30(e) was read to bestow
upon all deposed parties free rein to negate damaging testimony after thirty
days of consultation with their attorneys.147
It would be disastrous to allow an expansive reading of the Rule’s
language to essentially neuter summary judgment.148 The simplified
140 See United States v. Krieger, 773 F. Supp. 580, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
141 See Moberly, supra note 138, at 997‒98. 
142 Id.
143 Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969); see also Ryan A.
Mitchell, Comment, Is the Sham Affidavit Rule Itself a Sham, Designed to Give the Trial Court More
Discretion at the Summary Judgment Level?, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 255, 258 (2008) (tracing the sham
doctrine back to Perma Research). The court in Perma Research reasoned that permitting parties to
create an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting their own prior testimony would
“greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.”
410 F.2d at 578.
144 See Moberly, supra note 138, at 998; see also Hinch v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch.,
814 A.2d 926, 929 (D.C. 2003) (“Since Perma, all federal circuits that have considered applying the
sham affidavit doctrine have adopted it in some form, as have most states.”). For an opposing view
representing the minority federal position, see Pfizer, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 348 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136
n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), which asserts that affidavit contradictions create credibility issues reserved for the
trier of fact and resolved at the summary judgment phase in nonmovant’s favor.
145 See, e.g., Burns v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 330 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We see no
reason to treat Rule 30(e) corrections differently than affidavits . . . .”); see generally discussion supra
Part II.B.2 (discussing several cases in which courts have pointed out the parallels between sham
affidavits and errata sheet corrections).
146 See Eckert v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 95 c 6831, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15788, *16‒17 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998) (arguing that Congress could not have written Rule 30(e) to permit the
fabrication of sham issues of fact).
147 See id.
148 Of course, deponents are presumed still to be bound by the truth during these thirty days, and
opposing counsel can use their fabricated alterations to effectively impeach them at trial. But the
frequency with which these cases arise, and the fact that deponents can invoke their amended answers at
trial in courts that follow the expansive approach, suggest that for scores of deponents the deterrence
effect of these considerations is minimal.
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standard of the Federal Rules for notice pleading depends for its efficacy on
“liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed
facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”149 Denying
summary judgment the power to function by allowing substantive
deposition changes threatens to drown opposing parties in additional legal
costs.150 It also promises to further flood the federal system with lawsuits in
which the only possible dispute of fact is one that deponents create
themselves by the very act of altering the depositions. Confronting very
similar circumstances, the sham affidavit doctrine sensibly refuses to
recognize such “disputes” as the kind envisioned by Rule 56. By analogy,
so must it also be with Rule 30(e) changes.
3. “Plain Language:” Viewed in the Spirit and Context of a Clerical
Purpose.—Appeals to the plain language of Rule 30(e) are
incomplete and misleading without reference to the Rule’s transcriptive
focus. Read in historical context, the Rule appears to be distinctly clerical,
ill-equipped—and never intended—to embrace substantive changes.
Although its wording has changed over time, Rule 30(e) has retained one
modest but steady focus: the who, how, and what of accurate transcription.
The Rule is meant to secure an accurate representation of what was said,
leaving to another day (and frequently to the mechanisms of Rule 56) the
question of the meaning and implication of the deposition content for
purposes of material factual disputes. The common understanding of Rule
30(e) has moved far afield from that mild ambition, giving us the confusion
and circuit split we know today. Read in light of its history, the Rule clearly
embraces a transcriptive focus.151
The original Equity Rule 67, and the twin Equity Rules 50 and 51 that
succeeded it, had unmistakably clerical preoccupations with examiners of
the court and stenographers.152 Amidst its provisions on scheduling and
notice, Equity Rule 67 adjured the examiner to reduce the oral testimony to
writing, either in a question–answer configuration or, with the parties’
consent, in narrative form.153 Either party could request that the testimony
149 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
150 See, e.g., Hinch v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch., 814 A.2d 926, 929 (D.C. 2003) (“The
purpose of the [sham affidavit] doctrine is to spare the moving party the needless effort and cost when a
party’s prior statements show no actual factual dispute exists.”).
151 In Part I.B, supra, where this Comment outlined the history of Rule 30(e), it alluded to but did
not unpack the fact that a stenographical focus threads together the Rule and its predecessors. This is
because the aim in that Part was only to briefly unfold the Rule’s origin. But now it is time to pick up
this thread again, because in addition to telling us how the Rule came to be, it also instructs us how we
should read the Rule today.
152 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 649, 662–63 (1912)
(repealed 1937); Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 144 U.S. 689, 689–91
(1892) (repealed 1937).
153 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 144 U.S. 689, 689–91 (1892)
(repealed 1937).
106:893 (2012) “A Deposition Is Not a Take Home Examination”
915
be taken “by a skilful stenographer or by a skilful typewriter”—someone
elected by the examiner and approved by the court or both parties.154 The
rule even developed a payment plan for stenographers: the party calling the
deposed witness would cover their expenses in the first instance; thereafter,
the court would mete out the costs between both parties.155 Once the
testimony was reduced to writing, whether by examiner or stenographer,
Equity Rule 67 provided that its contents should be “read over to” the
witness.156 Thereafter, the witness was to sign the writing in the presence of
the attendees, “provided, that if the witness shall refuse to sign his
deposition so taken, then the examiner shall sign the same, stating upon the
record the reasons, if any, assigned by the witness for such refusal.”157
Equity Rule 67 said not a word further about the witness’s response to
the deposition transcript. It mentioned nothing about corrections—in form
or in substance—in its otherwise detailed description of the transcription
process. The same was true for Equity Rules 50 and 51.158 The new Equity
Rules did, however, continue the fixation with the who and the how of
transcription, as evidenced by the title of Equity Rule 50: “Stenographer–
Appointment–Fees.”159 This role was to be filled “[w]hen deemed necessary
by the court or officer taking testimony . . . .”160 The Rule envisioned a
stenographer who would “take down testimony in shorthand, and, if
required, transcribe the same.”161 The method of paying fees for this service
was again set out in detail.162 Equity Rule 51 (“Evidence Taken Before
Examiners, Etc.”) added a passage requiring objections during the
deposition to be brief—a change that abuse of the old rule had made
imperative.163 Otherwise, though, Equity Rule 51 principally replicated the
substance of Rule 67’s review provision.164 The closest the rules came to
addressing the question is the reasoning for a witness’s refusal to sign.
Given that Equity Rule 50 allowed for recorders to write the testimony in
shorthand, one can immediately imagine the errors, transcriptive in nature,
154 Id. at 690.
155 Id. at 691.
156 Id. at 690.
157 Id.
158 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 649, 662–63 (1912)
(repealed 1937).
159 Id. at 662.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 662‒63. 
163 Id. at 663.
164 Id. (“The testimony of each witness, after being reduced to writing, shall be read over to or by
him, and shall be signed by him in the presence of the officer; provided, that if the witness shall refuse to
sign his deposition so taken, the officer shall sign the same, stating upon the record the reasons, if any,
assigned by the witness for such refusal.”) (repealed 1937).
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that could prompt a deponent to express frustration and refuse to sign the
deposition.
The various versions of Rule 30(e), starting with its 1938 incarnation,
permitted changes in form or substance at the deponent’s request.165 But
these must be read in conjunction with the subject matter of the Equity Rule
out of which Rule 30(e) emerged: transcription. That concern has remained
central in the decades since. The 1993 advisory note, for example, explains
that the committee added the thirty-day window for deposition changes in
order “to reduce problems sometimes encountered when depositions are
taken stenographically.”166 It is true that the advisory committee has never
revised the Rule to indicate that changes in “form or substance” relate
specifically to clerical errors. But by the same token, the committee has
never amended the Rule or its advisory note to state clearly that it sets no
restrictions either.167
The transcriptive focus of the Rule’s forebears provides a prism
through which to interpret the phrase “changes in form or substance.” When
one reads Rule 30(e) in line with its origins and development, it becomes
clear that Rule 30(e) was intended to target clerical corrections.
Transcription errors can relate to matters of form as well as substance.
Regarding form, a recorder might mistakenly type an assertion in the shape
of a question or write out a deponent’s aside to her attorney as if it were part
of her answer. A stray or errant set of punctuation marks can misrepresent a
witness’s testimony, requiring the witness to make changes. The recorder’s
mistake could also be substantive in nature if the recorder omitted an
important word from a deponent’s answer or misheard a critical piece of
what the deponent actually said.
The Rule’s background also puts the lie to the notion that the use of the
word “any”168 frees the deponent to make literally any change that he or she
wishes.169 The use of “any” in the Rule’s requirement that the officer “must
attach any changes the deponent makes” has no such wide-ranging effect.170
Common sense, as well as the focus on accurate transcription that cuts
through the Rule, frames the “any” clause not as a deponent’s free license to
amend, but rather as an obligation upon the officer, in the name of accuracy,
165 See discussion supra Part I.B.
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) advisory committee’s note (1993).
167 Little can be made of the fact that the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the subject. In the
first place, the issue of errata alterations would likely require interlocutory review, which the Court has
shown reluctance to undertake. Further, the Court has repeatedly explained that the scope of the Federal
Rules can only be altered by amendment, not by judicial interpretation. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(2).
169 But see Gill, supra note 94, at 374–75 (relying upon one of the meanings of “any” listed in the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary—“an undetermined number or amount”—along with the presence of the
phrase “form or substance” to claim that “Rule 30(e) permits all changes to depositions”).
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(2).
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not to omit any of the changes that the deponent attempts to make. Even a
judge who fervently subscribes to the strict reading of Rule 30(e) would
want a complete record of the deponent’s proposed alterations.
4. Even Liberal Discovery Processes Have Outer Limits.—Over
sixty years ago, in its oft-cited ruling of Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme
Court made it explicit that deposition-discovery rules for federal procedure
“are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.”171 In advancing the stage
at which a disclosure can be compelled, the Court reasoned that the process
could reduce the possibility of surprise.172 But, the Court cautioned,
“discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary
boundaries.”173 As an example, the Court in Hickman pointed to Rule 30, as
well as Rule 31, to indicate that limitations inevitably arise on the liberality
of the discovery process “when it can be shown that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass or
oppress the person subject to the inquiry.”174
The outer, commonsense boundaries to which the Supreme Court
refers militate against an expansive reading of Rule 30(e). In no respect can
the federal discovery process be depicted as some sort of sacrosanct,
infinitely open undertaking. The deposition-discovery process is restricted,
quite intentionally, at points all along the spectrum to combat abuse,
minimize prejudice, and promote the fair administration of justice. When
deponents change their depositions in ways that add central details
unspoken during the original testimony or that flatly contradict what was
spoken in that earlier, supervised setting, they engage in precisely the sort
of bad faith conduct our discovery process aims to check.
The review period following the transcription of a deposition is one of
those points of limitation. Restrictions are crucial, and not merely the
technical requirements (e.g., the thirty-day window, the request to the
officer to review) that circumscribe the process and become oddly central to
the analysis of some courts’ disposition of Rule 30(e) questions.175 Rather,
restrictions are vital because the length of the review period implicates the
fundamental concerns of the process: abuse, prejudice, and fair—as well as
speedy—justice.
The temptation for abuse under a loosely construed Rule 30(e) is
immense. It touches deponents as well as their legal counsel,176 who are
likely to have a better sense of what portions of a deposition are potentially
171 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
172 Id.
173 Id. (emphasis added).
174 Id. at 507–08.
175 See discussion supra Part III.B.
176 See Dickerson, supra note 65, at 52 (“[S]ome attorneys encourage the deponent to change
damaging testimony. Such conduct raises serious legal and ethical questions, because directing a witness
to change his testimony is equivalent to witness coaching.”).
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damaging.177 Because of this, it is the attorneys, and not the deponents
themselves, who will most probably craft the deposition changes.178 As long
as an expansive reading of Rule 30(e) prevails, courts will tempt attorneys,
who are given a month away from oversight to mull their clients’ testimony,
to take actions that benefit their clients but which flout the ethical rules
imposed upon their representation.179 The same changes that opinions like
Lugtig allow without any judicial scrutiny180 can represent serious violations
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for the lawyer who makes
them.181 The Model Rules interdict attorneys from counseling or assisting a
witness to testify falsely,182 to falsify evidence knowingly,183 or generally to
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.184 A
single round of errata work on a client’s deposition has the potential to
implicate every single one of these ethical proscriptions. The Model Rules
undoubtedly deter most attorneys from making good on their worst
impulses. All the same, there is no reason to tempt attorneys to flout them
with an expansive reading that is at odds with the purpose and history of
Rule 30(e).
Interpreting Rule 30(e) involves answering integral questions about the
nature of depositions and their place in a discovery process that, while
liberal, is still circumscribed by common sense: what are depositions
designed to avoid, what makes them distinct, and what purposes do they
serve?
The deposition today is what it was in 1937: formal and adversarial.
This is due in no small measure to the belief that a structured, adversarial
milieu is likely to promote reliability and lead to a just outcome.185 At the
177 See, e.g., Combs v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 927 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, the
deponent was satisfied that his testimony was “correct and truthful,” but he gave leeway to his lawyer to
alter any of his responses. Id. at 488. The lawyer obliged, making thirty-six substantive changes that
frequently reversed the deponent’s “correct and truthful” answers to questions that were “of central
importance in the upcoming summary judgment hearing.” Id. The circuit court upheld dismissal of the
case and imposed double costs and attorney’s fees as sanctions for falsifying evidence. Id. at 488–89.
178 Macchiaroli & Tarin, supra note 64, at 11.
179 See Dickerson, supra note 65, at 57–58.
180 See 89 F.R.D. 639, 641‒42 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
181 See Dickerson, supra note 65, at 57‒58. 
182 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2010).
183 Id. R. 3.3(a)(4) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false.”).
184 Id. R. 8.4(d).
185 See, e.g., id. R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (2010) (invoking “the truth-finding process which the adversary
system is designed to implement”); Boyd v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 173 F.R.D. 143, 144 (D. Md. 1997)
(stating that “[t]he setting for a deposition mimics trial” with the one exception being the presence of a
judge); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 500 (1990) (“The fundamental expectation of an adversarial
system is that out of a sharp clash of proofs presented by litigants in a highly structured forensic setting
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very least, as with contemporaneousness, this structure limits the
deponent’s opportunity for dishonesty.186
Thus, we breathe an air of formality into deposition proceedings in
order to suggest that the deposition is an analog for the testimonial setting
of the trial. In the process, we also demonstrate that a liberal discovery
process is not the same as a boundless one. Thus, even though no judge
presides over the process, the deposition still bears the mark of a trial-like
setting, circumscribed by rules and infused with a degree of solemnity, to
make this vital part of the discovery process more reliable and less prone to
abuse.187 Hence the Federal Rules require deponents to swear an oath before
giving answers.188 They require the deposition to be taken before an officer
of the court who is authorized to administer oaths.189 They permit counsel to
subpoena a deponent to compel his or her appearance.190 The Rules allow
for the presence of opposing counsel and permit both examination and
cross-examination.191 They provide for the expression of objections to
questions.192 They further provide for stipulations by the parties.193 The
Rules prohibit the taking of a deposition before a person who is a party’s
relative, employee or attorney, or who is financially interested in the
action.194
Contrast these formal requirements with the postdeposition review
period that follows from an expansive approach, in which the liberal
discovery process would seem to lose any substantive (as compared to
procedural) requirements. Under the liberal reading of Rule 30(e), the
mechanisms that endow the deposition with a trial-like aura have little
will come the information upon which a neutral and passive decision maker can base a satisfying
resolution of the legal dispute.”).
186 It is wishful thinking to imagine that depositions might take on a less adversarial character so
long as we continue to structure them as a back-and-forth between a witness and opposing counsel. And
there is no persuasive reason to walk away from such a structure. The interaction between one party and
the other party’s attorney creates an inevitable tension; there are no delusions about where each side’s
loyalties lie. The structure of the deposition functions as a check on the temptations for abuse that this
tension may produce.
187 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947) (pointing to Rules 30(b) and (d),
governing depositions, as examples of points in the Federal Rules where liberal discovery gives way to
limits that are deliberately put in place to curb abuse and bad faith).
188 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(5)(A)(iv).
189 FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a)(1)(A)–(B).
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(B).
191 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1).
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2).
193 FED. R. CIV. P. 29.
194 FED. R. CIV. P. 28(c). For an opposing view about the appropriateness of the foregoing cited
features of the deposition-taking process, see Moritz, supra note 13, at 1373–74. In keeping with
Moritz’s view of the Federal Rules on deposition procedure as atavistic remnants of an earlier purpose,
he argues that rules regarding notice, officer qualifications, oath-taking, and the reduction of testimony
to writing “likely preference neither fact-gathering nor testimony-preservation.” Id.
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W
920
importance. Deponents take no additional oath to promote truthful
responses during the review period and may take the entire thirty days to
ruminate over their answers in concert with their own attorneys.195 They
may do so away from the gaze of opposing counsel or an officer of the
court. And under the expansive view of Rule 30(e), they may make
whatever changes they please to their sworn testimony during this period of
zero oversight. Why should we permit deposition answers to be “corrected”
substantively in the absence of the very strictures that govern every step of
their production in the first place?
5. The Deposition Process Is Already Designed to Discourage
Abuse.—An expansive reading of Rule 30(e) is also incompatible
with other prohibitions imposed on the deposition process. Perhaps the most
damning shortfall of the Lugtig approach is the striking way in which that
interpretation is out of tune with the established guidelines for attorneys’
communication with their witness clients during the deposition process.
First, the expansive reading of Rule 30(e) contradicts prevailing
thought about private conferences between deponents and their attorneys
during depositions. After the 1970 revision of Rule 30, as part of an effort
to deter deposition abuse, federal courts began targeting attorneys’ efforts to
talk privately with their deposed clients once the deposition had started.196
Courts promulgated local rules and handed down a number of decisions
aimed to establish a dictate of “no consultation” and stamp out practices of
“witness-coaching.”197 One of the most frequently cited cases to tackle this
issue was Hall v. Clifton Precision,198 which held that it was improper for
deponents to confer with their attorneys at any time between the beginning
and conclusion of a deposition, including during recesses, but excepting
discussions over whether to assert a privilege.199 In support of its
conclusion, the court in Hall cited to a number of orders from other courts
“holding that such conversations are not allowed.”200 Since its entry, Hall
has in turn become controlling case law that is widely and approvingly
195 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e).
196 See Moritz, supra note 13, at 1396; see also A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil
Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 282–86 (1998) (documenting jurisdictional efforts to limit private
conferences and other practices through local rules).
197 See David H. Taylor, Rambo as Potted Plant: Local Rulemaking’s Preemptive Strike Against
Witness-Coaching During Depositions, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1057, 1062–63 & nn.22–25 (1995) (listing in
detail a variety of local rules meant to quash private conferences, whether only during the actual
questioning—except in the case of asserting a privilege—or during the questioning and recesses).
198 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also Moritz, supra note 13, at 1396 (describing Hall as
“[o]ne of the most widely reported cases from this era”).
199 Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 531‒32. 
200 Id. at 527 & n.2; see also Taylor, supra note 197, at 1099 n.215 (summarizing these cited orders
and noting that they did not extend into short recesses between questions).
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cited.201 More and more courts follow Hall, holding that private
conferences, when they involve advice for specific questions and answers,
equate to impermissible witness coaching.202 This situation mirrors that of
an attorney advising a client to make specific changes to his deposition
transcript.203 If it is forbidden in one circumstance, it should be forbidden in
the other as well.204
Second, and more directly related to the scenario that Rule 30(e)
covers, the expansive reading stands at odds with the reasoning that
underpins restrictions on attorney communication elsewhere within Rule 30
itself. In 1993, the advisory committee revised Rule 30 to regulate the
raising of objections during depositions by deponents’ counsel.205 The
command that the committee put in place has moved from its original
location in Rule 30(d) to 30(c)(2), but its language remains virtually
identical. It reads: “An objection must be stated concisely in a
nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner.”206 The committee cited, as
grounds for the requirement, its concern with “lengthy objections and
colloquy, often suggesting how the deponent should respond.”207 To combat
this suggestive practice and to protect the integrity of the deposition, Rule
30 now significantly constrains the way attorneys can communicate with
the deponent—directly or indirectly—about their answers. Rule 30(c)(2)
does not create safeguards allowing for the trier of fact to make credibility
determinations about a deponent’s answers in light of the attorney’s
longwinded and suggestive objections. Rather, the Rule nips in the bud the
problematic practice it identifies and actively excludes the practice from the
deposition process. It would render Rule 30 incoherent to argue in the face
of Rule 30(c)(2) that Rule 30(e) allows deponents in tandem with their
attorneys to make any change they wish in form or substance, leaving the
policing up to the trier of fact far down the road of litigation.
201 See Taylor, supra note 197, at 1099‒1100; see also id. at 1098 n.212 (laying out four district
court cases that have cited Hall for the proposition that attorneys should not confer with deponents
during questioning); Dickerson, supra note 65, at 61 n.320 (listing opinions in different jurisdictions that
have approvingly quoted Hall).
202 See, e.g., Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., No. 09-291, 2010 WL 5865977, at *2 (D.N.J. July
21, 2010) (granting an additional deposition to discover attorney–client conversations that happened
during a recess at a previous deposition); Ngai v. Old Navy, No. 07-5653, 2009 WL 2391282, at *4‒6 
(D.N.J. July 31, 2009); Plaisted v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 210 F.R.D. 527, 532–33 (M.D. Pa. 2002);
Calzaturficio S.C.A.R.P.A. S.P.A. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 40 (D. Mass. 2001).
203 Dickerson, supra note 65, at 60.
204 See id.
205 Moritz, supra note 13, at 1395.
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2).
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) advisory committee’s note (1993).
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IV. FIXING THE SPLIT BY FIXING THE RULE
The expansive approach to errata changes conflicts with the history of
Rule 30, the purpose of Rule 30, and basic notions of fair and speedy
justice. As discussed earlier, even circuit courts rejecting Lugtig and its
progeny have differed in their implementation of an alternative.208 This Part
argues that the answer is to return to the reasoning of Greenway. It proposes
that federal courts should adopt a strict reading of Rule 30(e) that limits
errata alterations to clerical changes in which transcription errors have
affected the witness’s testimony “in form or substance.”209 And in order to
avoid further confusion, the Rule itself should be amended to reflect this
approach.
A. A Return to Clerical Concerns
We have seen that Rule 30(e) is deeply rooted in a clerical history,
aimed at accurately transcribing what was said and leaving to another day
the question of clarifying what the words mean.210 It is difficult to reconcile
the expansive, “majority” approach with the history of the Rule or with the
spirit undergirding the boundaries imposed upon the liberal discovery
process. Against this backdrop, there can be no room for a reading of the
Rule that “places no limitations on the type of changes that may be made”
to a deposition.211 The task, therefore, must be to restore the Rule to its
proper function—out of respect for its history, out of fidelity to the
formalized structure of the deposition, and out of consideration for the party
on the opposite side of a substantively altered deposition.212 While some of
the other strict-reading cases point us in the right direction, we must
ultimately embrace the approach of Greenway in order to restore deposition
changes to their proper context.
On the subject of fairness to party opponents, the Third Circuit’s 2010
decision in EBC, Inc. v. Clark Building Systems, Inc.213 makes a trenchant
observation. The court noted that “[p]reservation of the original testimony
for impeachment at trial serves as cold comfort to the party that should have
prevailed at summary judgment.”214 But the opinion fumbles the opportunity
to fully do right by the historical context of Rule 30(e). The “more flexible
208 See discussion supra Part II.B.
209 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e).
210 See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
211 Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Lugtig v. Thomas,
89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
212 See Dickerson, supra note 65, at 65 (observing, without explicitly endorsing the idea, that
changing the Rule so that most changes would be “limited to ‘form’” would prevent deponents from
changing substantive testimony to bolster their position).
213 618 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
214 Id. at 268.
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approach” that Clark Building Systems adopted215 permits courts to admit
contradictory errata under two fuzzy conditions: if “sufficiently persuasive
reasons” are given or “if other circumstances satisfy the court that
amendment should be permitted.”216
Judge Posner’s decision in Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp.217
takes us closer to a clerical reading because it categorically bars alterations
directly at odds with sworn testimony218 unless deponents can show the
change aims to undo an error in transcription.219 But the decision derails
when it suggested that the deponent’s effort, “whether or not honestly, . . .
to change his deposition from what he said to what he meant” was
permitted by Rule 30(e).220 Even the Hambleton Bros. and Burns cases that
take a harder line against sham-style changes fail to go quite far enough, in
that they adopt the position that “Rule 30(e) is to be used for corrective, and
not contradictory, changes,”221 but do not sufficiently define “corrective.”
Without more, the word could be stretched to cover additional details,
affixed to previous answers in order to “correct” the conclusions that might
have been drawn from those previous, unqualified answers.
We find ourselves, then, back where we began: with Greenway. Judge
Little’s terse opinion takes proper measure of the purpose of Rule 30(e) and
leaves no room for its clerical context to be ignored. It protects the
opposing party and honors the integrity of both the deposition process and
the transcriptive procedure that the Rule was intended to facilitate.
Following Greenway, the errata phase of the deposition process should be
strictly policed, and deponents should be allowed to make only clerical
changes affecting form222 (such as an assertion shown as a question, or a
misspelled name) or substance (such as the accidental omission of the word
“not”).223
B. Timing and Procedure
To accomplish this return to first principles of transcriptive accuracy
and fairness to all parties, the advisory committee should revise Rule 30(e)
215 Id. at 269 (quoting Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
216 Id. at 270. The opinion does note one scenario where changes are permitted that seems to honor
the clerical history of Rule 30(e): “[I]f the proposed amendments truly reflect the deponent’s original
testimony.” Id.
217 207 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000).
218 See id. at 389.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Hambleton Bros. Lumber v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005); accord
Burns v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 330 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2003).
222 See Greenway v. Int’l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992).
223 See id.
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to reflect Greenway’s thinking.224 The Rule ought to maintain its directive to
provide the reasons for all changes. In doing so, we would keep the burden
where it belongs: on the deponent, who is forced to show how the changes
cure errors and represent what was actually said at the deposition. The
updated version of the Rule should thus, when there is clerical error, grant
deponents a period of time in which: “(A) to review the transcript or
recording; and (B) if there are errors in the transcription or recording,
either in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the
reasons for making them.”
Choosing the number of days for any window of time under procedural
rules inevitably carries some degree of arbitrariness (why five days, for
example, instead of six, or eight?). But because the acceptability of
deposition changes depends on what was actually said and inaccurately
transcribed, the thirty-day window currently laid out in the Rule is too long
by any measure.225 The point is to correct the transcription flaws while
memories are still fresh and while the court can check with the reporter who
took down the deposition as well as the attorney who posed the questions.
Sister provisions of the Federal Rules relating to depositions give parties
two weeks with which to work. Under Rule 32, for instance, anything under
fourteen days is considered “short notice” for deposition purposes, and
attorneys cannot use depositions against a party who receives less notice
than this and moves for a protective order.226 Similarly shortening the
window in Rule 30(e)(1) to two weeks would better serve the need for fresh
recollection and would be consistent with the time frame found within other
deposition strictures. Reducing the time period also gives deponents and
their attorneys sixteen fewer days in which to battle the temptation to try
more substantive changes. The deponent’s attorney would be required to act
quickly before the opponent incorporates the deposition into the sort of
summary judgment motion that would otherwise likely trigger improper
changes.
C. Policing the Errata Sheet
Once the errata sheet has been submitted through the officer of the
court,227 the procedure would largely track its current route. Most
importantly, a copy would issue to the attorney from the opposing side who
conducted the deposition.228 If the changes do not conform to the
224 Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993) (explaining that matters covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be changed by the
process of amending the Rules rather than by judicial interpretation).
225 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1).
226 FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(5)(A). Under the previous version, the window was eleven days rather than
fourteen. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 (2006).
227 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(2).
228 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(f)(1).
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requirements of the tightened Rule 30(e), counsel may move to keep out the
changes. In egregious cases where the deponent’s conduct amounts to
“imped[ing], delay[ing] or frustrat[ing]”229 the deposition process, the court
should be able, in addition to disregarding the changes, to sanction the
deponent or her attorneys.230
CONCLUSION
As Greenway v. International Paper phrased it eighteen years ago, “[a]
deposition is not a take home examination.”231 The expansive interpretation
of Rule 30(e) is fatally flawed because it treats it as one. It ignores the
history and clerical function of the Rule itself, hints at a liberal discovery
process that is boundless rather than circumscribed by common sense,
collapses important distinctions between depositions and interrogatories,
ignores the deliberately formal, adversarial setting of the deposition, tempts
deponents and (especially) their attorneys to create sham factual disputes,
and offers small consolation to opposing parties for whom summary
judgment may otherwise be warranted. Ultimately, a strict reading of Rule
30(e) must prevail. And to end all confusion about the issue, the Rule itself
should be amended to permit changes “in form or substance” only where
there has been a breakdown in the transcription process with which the Rule
should fundamentally be concerned.
229 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
230 See, e.g., Norelus v. Denny’s, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1273, 1302 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the
discretionary sanctions leveled by district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) against attorneys who
submitted a sixty-three-page errata sheet with 868 alterations of plaintiff deponent’s testimony).
231 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992).
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